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  We  study  the  relationships  between  various  conceptions  of 
financial development and balanced economic growth. A model of 
endogenous  growth  that  incorporates  a  role  for  both  financial 
efficiency  and  access  to  financial  services  permits  a  better 
understanding of the relationship between the size of the financial 
sector (value added) and growth. Higher financial value added results 
from  some,  but  not  all,  kinds  of  finance-driven  growth.  If  greater 
access  rather  than  greater  efficiency  generates  higher  growth  then 
value  added  and  growth  can  be  positively  correlated.  We  present 
some  preliminary  empirical  results  that  support  the  importance  of 
access alongside efficiency in explaining cross-country variations in 
growth. 
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The literature on the relationship between nancial development and eco-
nomic growth has become one of the most important in applied economics.
The early empirical work of King and Levine (1993a,b) found that nancial
depth { the size of the nancial sector as a proportion of output { is an
important explanation for variations in growth across countries. The robust-
ness of that connection has been supported by subsequent studies such as
Demirg u c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine et al. (2000) and Rousseau
and Sylla (2005).1 While the argument that nance can matter for growth
is well-established, important variations have been found in the signicance
and direction of the nance-growth connection across countries (Demetriades
and Hussein, 1996), across stages of development (Rioja and Valev, 2004),
and across time (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011).
The empirical link between nancial development and growth has been
supported by the emergence of a theoretical literature on nancial interme-
diation and endogenous growth. Works such as King and Levine (1993b), de
la Fuente and Mar n (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998), Khan (2001) and
Aghion et al. (2005) oer a large number of ways in which nancial eciency
{ the costs of screening entrepreneurs, monitoring eort, providing liquidity
insurance, and so on { can impact on the equilibrium rate of technological
progress and so on long-run growth.2 More recently, Laeven et al. (2009)
and Greenwood et al. (forthcoming) have looked to incorporate endogenous
nancial innovation in models of growth.
1See Levine (2005) and Beck (2008) for surveys.
2See Capasso (2004) for a survey of the theoretical literature.
2This theoretical focus on the eciency of intermediation has been driven
by the dependence of endogenous growth models on the production of new
ideas and technologies. The complementarity between the empirical and
theoretical ndings thus rests upon the implicit assumption that eciency
and depth are both good proxies for the nancial development that matters
for economic growth in the long run.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on nance and growth
by developing simple models that can capture the connections between dif-
ferent concepts of nancial development when the economy is growing in the
long-run. Doing so suggests ways to understand some of the more nuanced
relationships between nance and growth observed in the data and point in
a number of directions for future empirical research.
Firstly, a simple neoclassical growth model demonstrates that balanced
growth restricts how nancial eciency is related to the quantity of nancial
services (nancial value added). Incorporating nancial eciency alone is not
sucient to understand why the size of the nancial sector might be posi-
tively related with growth. This is because value added must be constant
along the balanced growth path; when the long run growth rate changes,
value added and growth are negatively related. In order to understand the
implications of this, we secondly develop an endogenous growth model that
is extended to account for dierences in access to nance. This permits us to
see how a positive relationship between value added and the growth rate can
emerge. Specically, if nance-led growth results mainly from improvements
in access, then that higher growth can be associated with higher nancial
value added; if it results from greater nancial eciency, then the relation-
3ship between value added and growth can be zero or even negative. The
theoretical importance of access can be related to aspects of models such as
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Rousseau (1998). The contribution of
this paper is in bringing together dierent concepts of nancial development
in a simple model of growth with direct implications for the empirical liter-
ature. The role for access also gives weight to a recent literature (see Beck
and Demirg u c-Kunt, 2008) that stresses access to nance as a policy tool.
The endogenous growth model has two main implications for the empir-
ical assessment of the nance-growth nexus. The rst is that a focus on
the size of the nancial sector alone is not a reliable indicator of growth-
promoting nancial development. The ndings noted above, that nd the
nance-growth connection has weakened over time or is dependent on the
stage of development, are consistent with this theoretical implication but a
proper test would require more data on access than is currently available.
The second implication is that access and eciency are the key parts of
the nance-growth mechanism, and so should be considered alongside size
in growth regressions. New data on access in Kendall et al. (2010) presents
an opportunity to consider the role of access in supplementing the earlier
nance and growth regressions. We present some regression results that in-
clude proxies for eciency, access and nancial depth. We nd an important
role for access and eciency, but none for nancial depth.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 develops the simple
neoclassical model with a role for nancial eciency in determining the level
of technological progress. Section 3 presents the model of endogenous growth,
rst without considering access to nance. Using the model with access,
4we develop the implications for the relationship between long run growth
and nancial eciency, value added and access. Section 4 presents growth
regressions that include proxies for all three theoretical concepts of nancial
development. Section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Balanced Growth and Finance
Consider the following neoclassical production function,
Yt = F(Kt;Lt;At(t)) (1)
where capital, Kt, and labor, Lt, combine with a measure of technological
progress, At, to produce output and where F() has the usual characteristics,
including linear homogeneity. The parameter t denotes nancial eciency,
which enters as an input to the level of technological progress. In theoretical
analyses of nance and growth, something like t is generally the object of
interest. Exactly how it represents nancial matters and how it enters into
At can vary; for the purposes of this model, we simply assert that greater
nancial eciency increases the level of technology, A0 > 0.
Typically not modelled are the costs associated with that nancial ef-
ciency. Financial intermediary services provide, for example, specialized
screening of entrepreneurs of unknown type at a cost that reects the e-
ciency of nance. When rms pay those nancial intermediaries they allocate
resources away from investment or production. Financial value added is then
the sum of such costs as a proportion of aggregate output. When nancial
5eciency changes, the costs of intermediation change and so the sum of re-
sources going to nancial services can also change; that is, nancial eciency,
nancial value added and the level of technological progress are all connected.
Financial value added so dened enters into the capital accumulation
equation as follows,
_ Kt = Yt   Ct   D(t)Yt   Kt; (2)
where  > 0 is the depreciation rate, D(t) is nancial value added based on
the costs of nancial services and where there are no a priori assumptions
about D0.3
The economy is on a balanced growth path (BGP) if and only if output,
capital, consumption and value added are all positive and all grow at constant









where Dt is shorthand for D(t). Assume that there is no growth in the labor
supply, Lt = L for all t  0. The rst part of Proposition 1 makes clear that
if nancial value added is related with nancial eciency, then improvements
3So the total size of the nancial sector is D(t)Yt which can grow as the economy
grows. We could otherwise have let the absolute size of the nancial sector be some F(t)
and then have nancial value added as D(t) = F(t)=Yt.
6in nancial eciency cannot be related with improvements in technology.
Proposition 1 On the BGP, i) nancial eciency cannot be related with
sustained technological progress unless it does not interact with nancial value
added; and, ii), if nancial eciency is related to long-run technological
change without interacting with value added, it must be labor-augmenting.
Proof. The proof uses a variant of that of the Uzawa (1961) theorem found
in Schlicht (2006).4 We can re-write (2) for t  0 using the denition of a
BGP,




Taking the derivative of (7) with respect to time, we can see that on a BGP,
0 = (gy   gk)e




If gd+gy = gk then it must be that gy = gc and (gy  gk)(Y0 C0) = 0 which
cannot be true on a BGP since it would imply K0 < 0. As such, we must
have that D0 > 0, gd = 0 and that gc = gy = gk  0.
Consider that technology At augments one or both of the factors of pro-
duction with coecients of technological progress AK;t and AL;t. Then let




gytL); for any t  0: (9)
4See also Jones and Scrimgeour (2008).
7Since gy = gk, equation (9) shows that all technological progress, _ At=At = gy,
is purely labor-augmenting.
If D0 6= 0, part i) of the proposition follows from the BGP requirement
that gd = 0. If D0 = 0, part ii) follows from requirement that technological
progress, including that out of nancial eciency, be Harrod-neutral on BGP.
The proposition has two main implications, one for the relationship be-
tween nancial eciency and value added in an economy on a balanced
growth path, another for the relationship between nancial eciency and
technological progress on balanced growth. Sustained progress in nancial
eciency can only be part of technological change if, rst, nancial eciency
does not aect nancial value added and, second, it is labor-augmenting.
Both of these requirements might be considered somewhat restrictive. Either
way, the implication for nancial value added is clear: Away from balanced
growth path value added can vary but in the long-run it must be constant.
Sections 3 elaborates on the rst of these two implications in the context of
an endogenous growth model. That generates a number of insights, some of
which are addressed in the empirical analysis of section 4. The more gen-
eral implications of labour-augmenting technological change for nance and
growth are left for future research.
3 Finance and Endogenous Growth
In models of endogenous growth where nancial eciency matters, interme-
diaries exist to screen potential entrepreneurs, to monitor research eort,
8or to evaluate the quality of discoveries; that is, they intermediate between
those that wish to acquire new technologies or blueprints for intermediate
goods and those who have the ideas for those new technologies or blueprints.5
The expanding inputs model exposited in Acemoglu (2009) serves as a useful
framework within which to explore the balanced growth connections between
nance and growth. We adapt that model to include a simple screening prob-
lem with which the intermediary can be engaged. Other features of the model
are standard, so we leave some detail to Acemoglu (2009).
Preferences and technology
The representative household has CRRA preferences, choosing consumption












where  > 0 is the discount rate of the household and   0 is the coecient
of relative risk aversion.
Agents consume a perfectly competitive nal good, Yt, the price of which
is normalized to one at each date. The production of the nal good takes a











where v indexes input variety and Nt is the total number of machine input
5Consider the screening of entrepreneurial type in King and Levine (1993b) and Morales
(2003) and the monitoring of eort in de la Fuente and Mar n (1996) and Blackburn and
Hung (1998).
9varieties in existence at time t. The number Nt is thus our measure of
technological progress. The machines used as inputs to nal good production
are supplied by the holders of blueprints for those machines. The discovery
of new blueprints requires investment, Zt, in lab equipment. Where Xt is the
total spend on machines at t, the economy-wide resource constraint is,
Yt  Ct + Xt + Zt: (12)
Technological progress and nance
Some of the investment in lab equipment is dedicated to nancial intermedi-
ation of the King and Levine (1993b) type. Lab equipment can itself be of
dierent levels of quality: Capable (incapable) scientists have created good
(bad) lab equipment. A proportion  2 (0;1) of scientists are capable, the
remaining (1   ) are not. Only by investing in the good equipment, that
created by capable scientists, can new blueprints be discovered.
Machine producers can see who created what equipment but it is innitely
costly for them to see the type of scientist. Financial intermediaries exist
to reveal type by charging a fee for screening potential researchers. The
screening mechanism is perfect (the truth is always known, post-screen), but
the eciency of the screening, t, determines its cost.6 For a given t, the
evolution of new blueprints then follows,
_ Nt = NZt[1   f(t)]; (13)
6We also assume that the information from screening is public (so incapable scientists
receive no compensation) but that households represent a diversied pool of scientists.
This is in spirit of the original King and Levine (1993b) model.
10where N > 0 and f(t) is the fee charged for intermediation, expressed in
units of lab equipment invested.7 The eciency level t is exogenous but
not necessarily constant over time. The quantity of nancial services as a





The fee charged is based on the screening problem faced by the intermedi-
ary. Intermediaries face a cost z(t) > 0 of screening scientists from the pool
of applicants, where z0 < 0. An intermediary chooses the fee that maximises
expected prots from providing screening services,
E[profit] = [fZt   z(t)] + (1   )[ z(t)]: (15)






Evidently, an increase in nancial eciency will, other things equal, re-
duce the fee charged for intermediation, increase the rate of discovery of new
blueprints and decrease the level of nancial value added. Despite running
counter to evidence, it is intuitive in a set-up where nancial intermediaries
do nothing other than funnel research funding to the right research activi-
7We are restricting ourselves throughout to equilibria where [1   f(t)] > , i.e., where
screening is always better than not screening. The results below are not sensitive to the
way in which the nancial cost enters here. We could equally specify _ Nt = N[Zt  f(t)]
and balanced growth implications for nancial value added would remain the same (though
with a dierent implied cost structure for intermediation) and the economy-wide resource
constraint would include f separately from Z; see footnote 8 below.
11ties. As such, this implication is consistent with other nance and endoge-
nous growth models, and Section 3.1 shows that reconciling the eciency
and value added correlation with data requires us to modify the model only
slightly.
Equilibrium and the BGP







t is the machine price set by the blueprint holder.
Let t(v)  px
t(v)xt(v)    xt(v) be the instantaneous prots which ac-
crue from selling machine variety v at time t. Given that the blueprint
owner is a monopolist in producing the machine variety, the price px
t(v) is
chosen to maximise t(v). Because the demand for machines is iso-elastic,
the price px
t(v) is invariant across time and machine variety so we normal-
ize the marginal cost of machine production to   = (1   ). As such, the
prot-maximising price is px
t(v) = 1 and monopoly prots are t(v) = L.





Equation (18) implies that any balanced growth equilibrium where Yt grows
at a constant rate will also have that Nt grows at a constant rate.
The net present discounted value of a perpetual license to a blueprint can
12be written as,
Vt(v) =
t(v) + _ Vt(v)
rt
; (19)
where rt is the interest rate and _ Vt(v) is the change in the net present value
of a blueprint over time (see Acemoglu, 2009).
When there is positive technological progress, free entry to research re-
quires that one unit of spending on equipment leads to an equal net present
discounted return to the blueprint holder,
[1   f
(t)]NVt(v) = 1: (20)
An economy on a BGP is one where the growth rate of output (and







(rt   ): (21)
This Euler equation implies that a balanced growth path is characterized by a
constant interest rate. Since prots to blueprint ownership are also constant
over time, it must be that _ Vt(v) = 0: Combining this with equations (19) and
(20), the equilibrium interest rate along a BGP is,
r
 = [1   f
(t)]NL; (22)
which makes equilibrium balanced growth rate equal to,
g
 = 
 1 ([1   f
(t)]NL   ): (23)
13Equation (23) implies that the higher is the eciency with which nancial
intermediaries screen scientists, the higher is the equilibrium growth rate.
Financial eciency and nancial value added along the BGP
A direct result of equation (18) is that along a balanced growth path, Nt
must also grow at a constant rate _ Nt=Nt = g. We then have the following,
Proposition 2 Financial value added is constant on a balanced growth equi-
librium of the model.




N [Zt   z(t)=]
Nt
; (24)
which must be a constant on a BGP. Since total spending on machines is Xt =
(1   )NtL, the BGP combined with the economy-wide resource constraint
implies that the growth rate of Zt must be constant also which is not possible
unless z(t) is proportional to Zt. With z(t) proportional to Zt and using
equation (16), then nancial value added, equation (14), is a constant on
BGP.
Proposition 2 shows that a BGP requires that nancial costs as a pro-
portion of research spending, z(t)=Zt, is constant; that is, relative nancial
eciency is constant. This can happen if t falls over time in such a way to
make z(t) increase along with Zt, but it is more typical for something like






with Z > 0. Then the optimal fee charged by intermediaries is constant on
BGP, f(t) = Z=(t).8
This analysis provides a basis for the focus on relative nancial eciency
found in the theoretical literature.9 It also gives an idea about what must
be happening to nancial value added along a balanced growth path since
there is an implied relationship between value added and eciency when the
balanced growth path itself changes. Consider, for example, that relative -
nancial eciency increases. Since there are no transition dynamics, the rate
of growth of output and consumption along the balanced growth path imme-
diately increases, but nancial value added decreases { though consumption
growth is faster, the resources allocated to nance as a proportion of output
are smaller.
The model as laid-out so far suggests that it is not possible to have any-
thing other than a negative relationship between eciency and value added
on the balanced growth path. Though there has been evidence against the
nance-growth nexus in some countries and some time periods, there remains
strong evidence that size does matter in some countries or has mattered over
8If we had assumed _ Nt = N[Zt   f(t)] then f is the total fee for intermediation and
value added is Dt = f(t)=Yt = z(t)=(Yt) since now f = z(t)=. Balanced growth
again requires that nancial costs z(t) be proportional to Z along a BGP and so value
added is constant.
9Even in models where nancial innovation is endogenous, average nancial eciency
is constant along the balanced growth path. In Laeven et al. (2009) aggregate nancial
eciency is constant in steady state while for Greenwood et al. (forthcoming), relative
nancial eciency (and proportion of resources allocated to monitoring) is constant along
a balanced growth path.
15particular time periods. These variations in the measured connection be-
tween nance and growth requires that a model of nance and growth should
be able to account for both the presence and the absence of a role for the size
of the nancial sector in explaining variations in economic growth. Section
3.1 looks at what relaxations of the model are required in order to understand
this inconstancy.
3.1 Access to Finance
A number of models of nance and growth consider that a part of nancial
development can be an increase in the number of agents using nancial ser-
vices in addition to the eciency with which they do so. A simple exposition
is Townsend (1983), where development can be characterized as a proportion
of all non-nanced agents being `thrown' into the nancial sector at the start
of each period. Additionally, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model the
relationship between inequality, growth and the extent of nancial develop-
ment while Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) model barriers to risk sharing that
are progressively overcome through time.
Suppose that only some fraction t 2 [0;1] of scientists are able to be
screened, regardless of their type. The proportion t can aect both the cost
of screening and the rate of new discoveries. First, the larger the pool of
scientists (the higher is t) among whom the intermediary screens, the more
costly it is to screen out incapable scientists.10 The following formulation
10For a given amount of research funding to allocate, the higher is t the more screening






Second, the rate of increase in new blueprints increases in the portion that
have access to nance. So the evolution of blueprints follows,





















As before, greater nancial eciency increases long run growth. The im-
pact of access on growth depends on whether the costs from greater screening
are outweighed by the gains from the more rapid generation of ideas; i.e., if
t > 2tZ then greater access to nance increases long run growth (and
indeed this is necessary for positive growth). As already established, along
a BGP the ratio Zt=Nt is constant. The eect of an increase in nancial
eciency is to speed up the rate of discovery of new blueprints; the eect of
increasing access to nancial services is ambiguous, however. Compared with
the model where access is complete (t = 1 for all t), the nature of nancial
development along the balanced growth path can be very dierent. Suppose
that access and eciency can both change exogenously over time at rates _ t
and _ t, respectively. The BGP can then be characterized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 On the balanced growth path, nancial value added increases
at a rate proportional to that at which access increases.
17Proof. The BGP requires that
_ Nt












Financial value added is Dt = tf(t;t)' where ' = Zt=Yt is the constant
share of output allocated to research. Taking the derivative of value added
with respect to time and using (29), the change of value added on BGP is,
_ Dt = '_ t: (30)
Financial value added can grow while the economy is on the BGP if _ t > 0.
One solution to (29) is for the BGP to be characterized by no development
in access or eciency, _ t = _ t = 0. However, it is possible to have some forms
of nancial development on BGP. If increasing access is growth-reducing (i.e.,
if 2tZ > t), then it is possible to have _ t > 0 and so _ t > 0 on the BGP.
In that case, value added and eciency can both be increasing over time on
a balanced growth path. Clearly, there is a limit to this when access becomes
high (i.e., close to  = 1).
What is the correlation between long-run growth and value added when
access to nance can change? Suppose that nancial eciency and access
both increase over time, and that they combine to increase growth by some










_ t = d > 0; (31)
If 2tZ < t, equation (31) is the sum of the positive eects of increasing
18access and eciency on growth. Using (31), the change in value added is
simply,
_ Dt = '













which, using the expression for value added, Dt = tf(t;t)', and equilib-













Equation (32) gives the change in value added associated with higher long
run growth. If that higher growth is generated by greater access alone, then
the correlation between value added and growth will be positive. If the
higher growth comes from greater eciency, however, this correlation can be
negative.
To summarise, the model implies that greater nancial eciency will
always generate higher growth; that greater access will benet growth if the
faster idea generation outweighs the greater screening costs; and, that higher
value-added can be associated with higher growth if additional screening
costs outweigh the additional idea generation and if access is the predominant
source of nance-led growth.
4 Empirical Evidence
The cross-country approach to understanding the empirical relationship be-
tween nancial and economic development has, after King and Levine (1993a,b),
concentrated on nancial depth (the size of the nancial sector as a propor-
19tion of national output) as a measure of nancial development. Regressions
of average rates of growth of GDP per capita on average levels of nancial
depth over the period 1960{89 identied a positive and sometimes causal con-
nection running from nancial deepening to higher growth (see, e.g., Levine
et al., 2000, and the survey in Levine, 2005).
The theoretical model in Section 3 tells us two things of relevance for
the empirical study of nance and growth. The rst implication is that the
size of the nancial sector may not be a reliable indicator of growth driven
by nance.11 The specic theoretical implication of equation (32) is that
only where higher growth is supported by increasing access to nance rather
than increasing nancial eciency would we observe the positive relationship
between the size of the nancial sector and growth. Current cross-country
data on access does not permit this implication to be tested directly, but
this implication is consistent with some extant empirical results. Rioja and
Valev (2004) found that the level of development can matter for the strength
of the impact of nancial deepening on growth. If more developed countries
already have wide access to nancial services then more nancial develop-
ment would come from greater eciency and so the depth-growth connection
11The concept of nancial sector size used in the model is the contribution of the -
nancial sector to total output, while in the data it is nancial depth. The former clearly
has to be less than one but the latter can be larger. Ideally we would have measures of
the contribution of the nancial to output for a large range of countries over a substantial
period of time but, at present, it is only available for OECD countries. For the OECD
countries, we can use data from the STAN Structural Analysis Database, OECD (2010).
The most relevant measure of value added relative to total economy is for the nance,
insurance, real estate and business services as a whole. For the period we study below
(1987{2008), the correlation coecients between average value added and standard con-
cepts of nancial depth is quite high: For liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, 0.61; for stock
market capitalization, 0.58; for bank deposits, 0.63; and, for private credit, 0.40. As such,
we use depth as a proxy for the value added concept in the theory.
20would, according to equation (32), be lower. The same logic would apply to
Hasan et al. (2009) which nds that the eciency of nancial intermedi-
ation dominates the quantity of credit in its importance for growth in an
empirical study of European countries. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) show
that the impact of nancial deepening on growth has diminished into the
later 20th century, a nding apparently driven by the incidence of nancial
crises. More recently, Demetriades and Rousseau (2011) have found that
banking supervision has become a more important indicator of the nancial
development that matters for growth. Their interpretation that the quality
of nancial development has become more important than the quantity of
nancial development echoes the theoretical trade-o between eciency and
value added.
The second implication of the model is that nancial eciency and access
should be considered alongside a measure of the size of the nancial sector in
growth regressions. This can be tested using new data on access to nancial
services in Kendall et al. (2010). Table 1 depicts OLS regressions of growth
on various measures of access, depth and a measure of eciency. The de-
pendent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita
over the period 1987{2008 and all regressions are conditioned on log initial
GDP. Data on GDP and growth is from Heston et al. (2011). The access to
nance data is from Kendall et al. (2010) and we use the log of the number
of commercial bank branches per hundred thousand adults and the log of
commercial bank deposit accounts per hundred thousand adults. Financial
depth and eciency data is from Beck et al. (2000): We use three common
measures of nancial depth, the ratios of private credit, liquid liabilities and
21stock market capitalization to GDP; nancial eciency is measured as the
net interest margin (so a negative correlation with growth).
Table 1: OLS Growth Regressions on Access, Depth, and Eciency
1 2 3 4 5 6
access 1 0.71 0.74 0.74 - - -
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
access 2 - - - 0.39 0.40 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.70)
depth 1 0.26 - - 0.41 - -
(0.59) (0.37)
depth 2 - -0.63 - - 0.45 -
(0.60) (0.15)
depth 3 - - 0.18 - - 0.35
(0.73) (0.25)
eciency -15.46 -20.10 -19.14 -17.72 -17.05 -26.27
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
n 64 64 53 90 90 77
R2 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.21 0.22 0.32
N.B. Numbers in parentheses are robust p values. All variables are
averaged over 1987{2008 except access, which is dated around 2004. The
dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita; access 1 is log of commercial bank deposit accounts per 100,000
adults; access 2 is commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults; depth
1 is private credit to GDP; depth 2 is liquid liabilities; depth 3 is stock
market capitalization; eciency 1 is net interest margin; all regressions
are conditioned on log GDP in 1987.
As found in other studies that consider a similar time period, such as
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011), depth is not statistically signicant in any
permutation of the reported regressions. Financial eciency is strongly sig-
nicant, as would be implied by the theory. In addition, the access variable is
statistically signicant in all but one permutation. The number of commer-
cial bank deposit accounts per 100,000 adults is always strong statistically
signicant. The number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults
22is statistically signicant in two of the three permutations. While these re-
sults are only indicative correlations, they suggest that access could have an
important role in explaining variations in growth. Even where the size of
the nancial sector is not signicant, as in these regressions, incorporating
eciency and access in addition to a measure of depth adds to our under-
standing of what forms of nancial development can contribute to long-run
growth. Further research to identify causality requires additional data.12
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed an endogenous growth model incorporating access
to nancial services as well as nancial eciency. The model suggests that
our attention should be concentrated on those aspects of nancial develop-
ment which are more fundamentally growth-promoting as opposed to the
measures of the size of the nancial sector. While theoretical studies on -
nance and growth have not generally used depth or value added to proxy for
nancial development, empirical studies have used depth in order to identify
the nexus in the data. By drawing out the theoretical implications for value
added we have seen why empirical estimates on the relationship between
value added (or depth) and growth can be unreliable. A focus on the quality
of nancial intermediation, rather than its quantity, appears key.
There are a number of potential extensions to this paper. The conception
of nancial eciency could be expanded beyond simply the cost of screening
entrepreneurs. This would have implications for the implied relationship
12Particularly since here access is only available widely for a period around the end of
the period over which we average other variables
23between eciency and value added if lower transaction costs or greater risk
sharing was related with higher growth via the size of the nancial system, as
in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Further, the connections between eciency
and access could be explored in a model where access was endogenous to the
costs of using nancial services. Finally, it would be interesting to consider a
model with capital. The Uzawa (1961) theorem holds that, along a balanced
growth path, all technological change must be labour-augmenting. Making
a distinction between nancial intermediation which separately benets the
discovery of capital- and labor-augmenting technologies would be a direction
for future theoretical and empirical research. Models in which the direction
of nancial innovation matters could follow from work such as Laeven et al.
(2009) in which nancial development itself is endogenous, and might lead to
a richer understanding of the nature of nancial development in economies
which go through a period of takeo in long-run growth.
The implications for empirical research have been discussed. Measures
of the size of the nancial sector appear unreliable as growth-determinants.
The importance of access in explaining a positive correlation between e-
ciency and value added suggests ways to approach the empirical estimation
of the nance-growth nexus, with a particular focus on the importance and
determinants of access to nance. Data such as Kendall et al. (2010) is well
placed to enable such research.
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